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COMMENT
THE CURTIS DOCTRINE: THE RIGHTS OF A
MINORITY UNION TO PICKET
In Curtis Bros., Inc... the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB)
first enunciated the rule that picketing for recognition by a union
representing a minority of the employees was an unfair labor practice
because it violated section 8(b) (1) (A) 2 of the National Labor Rela-
tions Act. The doctrine has never had the full support of all Board
members.' Moreover the initial reaction of the reviewing courts to
this ruling has been unfavorable. The Curtis doctrine has been entirely
rejected by the District of Columbia Court of Appeals,' upon review
of the Board's decision of the case, and partially rejected by one Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals decision.' The NLRB has sought review by
the Supreme Court of the unfavorable decision of the Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia. The Supreme Court has granted certiorari
and the case is now pending in that Court.6
The purpose of this Comment is to inquire into the nature and
rationale of the Curtis rule to determine, if possible, the probability of
its ultimate acceptance by the Court. The significance of the rule
should be apparent: It both operates as a barrier to the successful
unionization of businesses and becomes an important weapon in the
hands of an employer or non-union employee to prevent (if that is
desired) the unionization of the employer's establishment.
THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Section 8(b) (1) (A) of the "Taft-Hartley Act" states that it shall
be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents to
"restrain or coerce" employees in their rights guaranteed under Sec-
1 NLRB v. Drivers, Chauffers, Helpers Union, Local 639, 119 N.L.R.B. 232, 41
L.R.R.M. 1025 (1957); see, Curtis Case and Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Taft-Hartley
Act, 44 VA. L. Rrv. 741 (1958).249 STAT. 452 (1935); 61 STAT. 140 (1947); 65 STAT. 601 (1951); 29 U.S.C. §
158(b) (1947), "It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its
agents-() to restrain or coerce (A) employees in the exercise of the rights guar-
anteed in section 7.'
sMember Murdock dissented from the decision in the original case, 41 L.R.R.M.
1034, and Member Fanning has since had occasion to express his disagreement with
the doctrine, 42 L.R.M. 1197 (1958).
4 Drivers Local 639 v. NLRB, 43 L.R.R.M. 2156 (1958).
5 NLRB v. International Ass'n of Machinists, 43 L.R.R.M. 2348 (1959).6 Docket No. 717, 27 LW 3293; cert. granted, 79 Sup. Ct. 876 (April 20, 1959).
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tion 77 of the act. Those rights include the right to bargain collectively
or to refrain from so bargaining.
The first important NLRB decision construing section 8(b) (1) (A)
was the National Maritime Union, CIO case,8 hereinafter referred to
as the NMU case. In the NMU case the NLRB held that section
8(b) (1) (A) does not apply to peaceful picketing, declaring:
The touchstone of a strike which is violative of Section 8(b) (1) (A)
is normally the means by which it is accomplished, so long as its
objective is directly related to the interests of the strikers, and not
directed primarily at compelling other employees to forego the rights
which Section 7 protects.9
In reaching this conclusion, the Board strongly relied on legislative
history of the act to limit the apparent broadness of the section." The
NLRB also suggested its conclusion was reached on the theory that
unless the section were limited, every peaceful strike opposed by any
employee would be a violation of 8(b) (1) (A) and thus the section
would negate the other provisions of the statute protecting collective
bargaining.
The Board made another argument in the NMU case based upon
section 8(b) (4) (C)." That section makes it an unfair labor practice
for a union to "force or require" an employer to recognize or bargain
with it when another labor organization has been certified by the
Board. The Board argued that if 8(b) (1) (A) were applied to peaceful
picketing, then section 8(b) (4) (C) would be rendered nugatory.
Therefore, the argument goes, section 8(b) (4) (C) indicates congres-
749 STAT. 542 (1935) ; 61 STAT. 140 (1947); 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1947). "Employees
shall have the right to selforganization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to
bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in
other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid
or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all of such activities
except to the extent that such right may be effected by an agreement requiring mem-
bership in a labor organization as a condition of employment as authorized in section
8 (a) (.3)."
878 N.L.R.B. 971 (1948).
9 Id. at 986.
10 See, 93 CoNG. REc. 4561-4563 (1947); 93 CONG. RF.C. 6136 (1947); Sen. Rep.
No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 50.1149 STAT. 452 (1935); 61 STAT. 140 (1947); 65 STAT. 601 (1951); 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(b) (4) (C) (1947). "It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization
or its agents . . . (4) to engage in, or to induce or encourage the employees of any
employer to engage in, a strike or a concerted refusal in the cause of their employment
to use, manufacture, process, transport, or otherwise handle or work on any goods,
articles, materials, or commodities or to perform any services where an object thereof
is . . . (C) Forcing or requiring any employer to recognize or bargain with a par-
ticular labor organization as the representative of his employees if another labor
organization has been certified as the representative of such employees under the pro-
visions of section 9."
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sional intent to dal with recognitional picketing and thus sets the
limits of the operation of 8(b) (1) (A) in that area. This analysis has
some force, but it is not entirely accurate. It is possible that a union
which had been certified after a Board election could lose its majority
status to a rival union which picketed for recognition instead of seek-
ing a Board election.1" This picketing would be precluded by 8(b)
(4) (C), but not by the Curtis doctrine (since the picketing union
represented a majority), and hence section 8 (b) (4) (C) is not rendered
entirely nugatory by the Curtis definition of 8(b) (1) (A). Of course
this is a restricted view of the operation of 8 (b) (4) (C). Every other
purpose which it would serve is also served by application of the
Curtis doctrine. In lieu of accepting such a narrow scope for 8 (b) (4)
(C), it can be cogently argued that Congress intended that section
to be the sole deterrent to peaceful picketing and that the Curtis
doctrine is therefore erroneous.
There is another argument that section 8(b) (4) (C) is not rendered
nugatory by the Curtis doctrine, predicated on the reasoning that
section 10(l)15 gives the NLRB additional powers and responsibilities
in dealing with a violation of that section. Section 10(l) provides that
the NLRB shall obtain injunctive relief against violation of 8 (b) (4)
(C) whereas the Board need not obtain an injunction under section
10(J)." Thus, it may be maintained that Congress intended that
1249 STAT. 452 (1935); 61 STAT. 140 (1947); 65 STAT. 601 (1951); 29 U.S.C.
§ 159(c) (3) (1947). "No election shall be directed in any bargaining unit or any sub-
division within which in the preceding twelve-month period, a valid election shall have
been held. Employees on strike who are not entitled to reinstatement shall not be
eligible to vote."
1 *48 STAT. 926 (1934) ; 49 STAT. 453 (1935) ; 49 STAT. 1921 (1936) ; 61 STAT. 146
(1947); 62 STAT. 991 (1948); 63 STAT. 107 (1949); 29 U.S.C. § 160 (1947). "When-
ever it is charged that any person has engaged in an unfai labor practice within the
meaning of paragraph (4) (A), (B), or (C) of section 8(b) of this title, the pre-
liminary investigation of such charge shall be made forthwith and given priority over
all other cases except cases of like character in the office where it is filed or to which
it is referred. If, after such investigation, the officer or regional attorney to whom the
matter may be referred has reasonable cause to believe such charge is true and that a
complaint should issue, he shall, on behalf of the Board, petition any district court of
the United States (including the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia) within any district where the unfair labor practice in question has occurred,
is alleged to have occurred, or wherein such person resides or transacts business, for
appropriate injunctive relief.... .Upon the filing of any such petition the district
court shall have jurisdiction to grant such injunctive relief or temporary restraining
order as it deems just and proper, notwithstanding any other provision of law. .. .
14 48 STAT. 926 (1934) ; 49 STAT. 453 (1935) ; 49 STAT. 1921 (1936) ; 61 STAT. 146
(1947) ; 62 STAT. 991 (1948) ; 63 STAT. 107 (1949) ; 29 U.S.C. § 160 (J). "The Board
shall have power, upon issuance of a complaint as provided in subsection (b) of this
section charging that any person has engaged in or is engaging in an unfair labor
practice, to petition any district court of the United States (including the United
States District Court for the District of Columbia), within any district wherein the
unfair labor practice in question is alleged to have occurred or wherein such person
1959]
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section 8(b) (4) (C) would enable the Board to prevent an especially
serious violation of the act.
The later NLRB decisions more clearly delimited the extent of the
restricted view of the scope of section 8(b) (1) (A). It became appar-
ent from the early NLRB decisions following the NMU case that the
principal impact of section 8(b) (1) (A) would be to prevent a union's
use of physical violence."5 The Board also applied the section to threats
of business and economic retribution. 6 While the NLRB initially
followed the NMU "means" test, the later decisions clearly have found
that strikes which violate some other section of the act also violate
resides or transacts business, for appropriate temporary relief or restraining order.
Upon the filing of any such petition the court shall cause notice thereof to be served
upon such person, and thereupon shall have jurisdiction to grant to the Board such
temporary relief or restraining order as it deems just and proper."
15 W. T. Smith Co., 38 L.R.R.M. 1280 (1956); Sunset Line and Twine Co., 79
N.L.R.B. 1487 (1948) ; Higbee Co., 97 N.L.R.B. 654 (1951) ; Eagle Mfg. Corp., 112
N.L.R.B. 74 (1955). One assault has been held to be sufficient to violate section
8(b) (1) (A), Midwest Transfer Co., 112 N.L.R.B. 17 (1955); mass picketing by a
union is a violation of 8(b) (1) (A), Sunset Line and Twine Co., supra. Further,
blocking a gate plus the carrying of sticks coupled with other violence violates
8(b) (1) (A), Smith Cabinet Mfg. Co., 81 N.L.R.B. 886 (1949). But see Ryan Constr.
Corp., 85 N.L.R.B. 417 (1949), where the Board found no violation from a gate
locking incident when there was no stoppage of traffic. In Santa Anna Lumber Co.,
87 N.L.R.B. 937 (1949), the Board found no violation of 8(b) (1) (A) from evidence
that an employee was trailed. But see Sunset Line and Twine, supra.
In order to charge the union with a culpable act of violence, the Board must also
find that the offensive acts were committed by the "labor organization or its agents."
See n. 2 supra. While the statutory definition of "agent" contained in section 2(13) of
the act is not helpful in determining what that term means, the NLRB has found a
sufficient "agency" where a union official was present when the culpable acts occurred
and did nothing to prevent them; accord, Sunset Line and Twine Co., supra; Corey
Corp., 84 N.L.R.B. 972 (1949); see, Irwin Lyons, 87 N.L.R.B. 54 (1949), where
there was no showing that any union officials were present. But see, Smith Cabinet
Mfg. Co., supra, where it was stated that there is a presumption that all actions
incident to a strike are attributable to the union. Section 2(13), 49 STAT. 450 (1935) ;
61 STAT. 137 (1947) ; 29 U.S.C. § 152 (1947), states: "In determining whether any
person is acting as an 'agent' of another person so as to make such other person re-
sponsible for his acts, the question of whether the specific acts performed were actually
authorized or subsequently ratified shall not be controlling."
16Threats of business or economic retribution violate 8(b) (1) (A) if they are
"reasonably calculated" to have a coercive effect on the listener in the exercise of his
rights. Higbee, 97 N.L.R.B. 654 (1951); G. H. Hess, Inc., 82 N.L.R.B. 463 (1949)("There's been a lot of rough stuff at these union elections.") ; Seamprufe, Inc., 82
N.L.R.B. 902 (1949) ("Those who don't join the union will eventually lose theirjobs.") ; G. H. Hess, Inc., 82 N.L.R.B. 464 (1949) ("If you don't vote for the union
the girls will refuse to work with you."). Statements made only to company officials
are not coercive with regard to employees. Smith Cabinet Mfg. Co., supra n. 11; Perry
Norvell Co., 80 N.L.R.B. 225 (1948).
Further, if the union enters into a contract including an illegal security provision
(closed shop), then upon the execution of the contract with the employee's knowledge,
there is a violation of 8(b) (1) (A). Permanente S.S. Corp., 107 N.L.R.B. 1111(1954); New York State Employers Ass'n, 93 N.L.R.B. 127 (1951), enforced, 196
F2d 78 (2d Cir. 1952). It is immaterial whether the agreement was enforced. Mono-
lith Portland Cement Co., 94 N.L.R.B. 1358 (1951).
[VOL. 34
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section 8(b) (1) (A).17 However, with the exception of strikes which
comprised an unfair labor practice under the act, the NLRB con-
sistenfly had refused to go so far as to hold that peaceful picketing
could be a violation of 8(b) (1) (A).18 Thus, the scope of 8(b) (1) (A)
was tending to be quite limited since, although a union could be en-
joined from "coercing" employees (i.e., threatening or assaulting
them), the principal weapons of the union, the strike and the picket
line, remained unaffected.
THE CuRms Doc:mn4
In the Curtis Bros., Inc., decision, the NLRB impliedly overruled
its prior decisions and stated that any picketing for recognition by a
minority union was a violation of 8 (b) (1) (A). The Board, however,
17The specific sections referred to are sections 8(b)(2) 8(b) (4) (A), and
8(b) (4) (C). Section 8(b) (2), 49 STAT. 452 (1935) ; 61 STAT. 140 (1947) ; 65 STAT.
601 (1951) ; 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (2) (1947), states: "It shall be an unfair labor practice
for a labor organization or its agents... (2) to cause or attempt to cause an employer
to discriminate against an employee in violation of subsection (a) (3) . . . (4) to
engage in, or to induce or encourage the employees of any employer to engage In, a
strike or a concerted refusal in the course of their employment to use, manufacture
process, transport, or otherwise handle or work on any goods, articles, materials, or
commodities or to perform any services, where an object thereof is: (A) forcing or
requiring any employer or self-employed person to join any labor or employer organi-
zation or any employer or other person to cease using, selling, handling, transporting
or otherwise dealing in the products of any other producer, processor, or manufacturer,
or to cease doing business with any other person; (C) . ." (For contents of sub-
section (C), see n. 11, supra.)(1) Violations of 8(b) (2) were at first held not to be violations of 8(b) (1) (A).
International Typographical Union, 86 N.L.R.B. 951 (1949); In the Matter of Ameri-
can Radio Ass'n, 82 N.L.R.B. 1344 (1949); In the Matter of Amalgamated Meat
Cutters, 81 N.L.R.B. 1052 (1949) ; Clara-Val Packing Co., 87 N.L.R.B. 703 (1949),
enforcement denied, 191 F.2d 556 (9th Cir. 1951). However, the later decisions clearly
came to a contrary result. Pinkerton's Nat'l Detective Agency, Inc., 90 N.L.R.B. 205(1950), enforced, 202 F.2d 230 (9th Cir. 1953); Englander Co., 108 N.L.R.B. 38(1954); Randolph Corp., 89 N.L.R.B. 1490 (1950); Kogap Lumber Indus., 96
N.L.R.B. 165 (1951); Hollywood Ranch Mkt., 93 N.L.R.B. 1147 (1951). Forcing adiscriminatory discharge is also a violation. Ann Bodrog, 111 N.L.R.B. 460 (1955),
enforced, 228 F.2d 425 (3d Cir. 1955)(2) Prior to 1957, the NLRB held that violations of 8(b)(4) (C) were not also
violations of 8(b) (1) (A). Tungsten Mining Corp., 106 N.L.R.B. 903 (1953) ; Miami
Copper Co., 92 N.L.R.B. 322 (1950); cf. Perry Norvell Co., 80 N.L.R.B. 225 (1948)(holding that a strike did not violate 8(b) (1) (A) merely because the strike violated
the union's contract). The NLRB had also held that violations of 8(b) (4) (A) were
not also violations of 8(b) (1) (A). Watson's Specialty Store, 80 N.L.R.B. 533(1948); Kanawha Coal Operator's Ass'n, 94 N.L.R.B. 1731 (1951). However, the
NLRB now holds that 8(b) (4) (A) violations also violate 8(b) (1) (A). Ruffalo's
Trucking Service, Inc., 41 L.R.R.M. 1270 (1958) (inducing employees of a neutral
employer not to deliver to the struck employer's plant); Alling & Corey Co., 42
L.R.R.M. 1347 (1958) (following the employer's truck and requesting the other em-
ployees not to handle the goods) ; Virginia-Carolina Freight Lines, 43 L.R.R.M. 1475(1959) (union representative stated that "if this keeps up someone will get hurt.")
Is Clara-Val Packing Co., see n. 17, supra; Perry Norvell Co., see n. 17, supra;
Watson's Specialty Store, see n. 17, supra.
1959]
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continued to apply 8(b) (1) (A) to the established "coercive" activities
of the union such as physical violence."
The Board in the Curtis case specifically reserved the issue of
whether an organizational strike is a violation of 8(b) (1) (A) and
placed its decision upon the finding that the picketing of the Curtis
Company was recognitional.
Recognition is a technical word under the act,2" involving an em-
ployer's admission that a union represents a majority of his employees
and that he will recognize this union as the exclusive bargaining agent
for wages, working conditions, etc. A union may also utilize the
picketing method to organize employees. That is, the union may picket
to persuade the employees to join in the hope that it will eventually
represent a majority of the employees.
The rationale, then. of the Curtis case is:
[Since 8(b) (1) (A) is not restricted by any provision of the act] em-
ployees who chose to continue working while the union is applying this
economic hurt to the employer, can not escape a share of the damage
caused to the business on which their livelihood depends. Damage to
the employer during such picketing is a like damage to his employees.
That the pressure thus exerted upon the employees-depriving them
of the opportunity to work and be paid-is a form of coercion cannot
be gainsaid. There is nothing in the statuatory language of Section
8(b) (1) (A) which limits the intendment of the words 'restrain or
coerce' to direct application of pressure by the Respondent Union of
the employees. The diminiution of their financial security is not the
less damaging because it is achieved indirectly by a preceding curtail-
ment of the employer's interests.5
The Board defended its organizational-recognitional distinction by
arguing that the picketing for organization purposes is not "tainted"
19 Union Packinghouse Co., 43 LR.R.M. 1460 (1959); Ohio Tel. Co., 43 L.RR.M.
1033 (1958). But see, Midland Elec. Races, 43 L.R.R.M. 1205 (1959), where the
Board refused to find a violation of 8(b) (1) (A) from a showing of mere pushing
coupled with no physical injury. Such violation can occur after the picketing is
finished. Lau Blawing Co., 43 L.R.R.M. 1411 (1959).
The Board has adhered to its later 8(b) (2) decisions, holding that violation of
8(b) (2) also violate 8(b) (1) (A). Spector Freight Lines, 43 L.R.R.M. 1358 (1959);
Wyatt Mfg. Co., 34 Labor Cases 71,409 (1958).
2049 STAT. 452 (1935); 61 STAT. 140 (1947); 65 STAT. 140 (1951); 29 U.S.C. §
158(a) (5) (1947). This enactment states that it shall be an unfair labor practice "to
refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees, subject to the
provisions of section 9(a)." 49 STAT. 453 (1935) ; 61 STAT. 143 (1947); 65 STAT. 601(1951) ; 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1947) states that "Representatives designated or selected
for the purposes of collective bargaining by the majority of the employees in a unit
appropriate for such purposes, shall be the exclusive representatives of all the em-
ployees in such unit for the purposes of collective bargaining in respect to rates of pay,
wages, hours of employment, or other conditions of employment."
21 119 N.L.R.B. at 237.
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with the commission of an unfair labor practice, whereas, "there can
be no more direct deprivation of the employee's freedom of choice
than to impose upon them a collective bargaining agent they have not
chosen or have expressly rejected.M22
The Board bolstered its theory by arguing that since section
8(a) (1)28 requires that the employer not interfere with his employees'
rights under section 7, the employer would be violating those rights
if he recognized a minority union. On the other hand, it can be argued
that a comparison of the "interfere, restrain, and coerce" language of
8(a)(1) with the "restrain and coerce" language of 8(b)(1)(A)
would indicate that Congress intended section 8(b) (1) (A) to have a
more narrow scope than 8(a) (1).
The Curtis doctrine is limited in its application to picketing by a
minority union because of several provisions of the act. Section 9(a)"'
of the act provides that a union shall be selected for the purpose of
collective bargaining if that union is selected by a majority of the
employees in an appropriate unit. Further, 8(a) (5)25 places a duty
on the employer to bargain collectively with such a majority union.
Thus, the act clearly makes concerted activity by a union representing
a majority of the employees protected activity. However, with the
possible exception of 8(b) (1) (A), the act does not deal with the
activities of a minority union.
The Board answered the argument contained in the NMU case
with regard to the legislative history by stating that: (1) the legisla-
tive history of this section is ambiguous, and (2) that an ambiguous
legislative history ought not override the "clear policy" of the section
to outlaw a strike by a minority union for recognition.
Recognitional picketing. The NLRB has consistently followed the
precepts of the Curtis case in its later decisions. The inquiry, then,
is to determine the extent and importance of the doctrine as it is
normally applied in these subsequent NLRB decisions.
In order to examine this development, it will first be necessary to
consider what sort of facts the NLRB will require to find that picket-
22 119 N.L.R.B. at 239.
2349 STAT. 452 (1935); 61 STAT. 140 (1947); 65 STAT. 601 (1951); 29 U.S.C.§ 158(a) (1) (1947) states that "It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer-
(1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guar-
anteed in Section 7."
2449 STAT. 453 (1935); 61 STAT. 143 (1947); 65 STAT. 601 (1951); 29 U.S.C.
159(a) (1947). See n. 20 supra.
2549 STAT. 452 (1935); 61 STAT. 140 (1947); 65 STAT. 601 (1951); 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(a) (5) (1947). See n. 20 sura.
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ing is "recognitional" under the Curtis doctrine. It is not difficult to
determine that the strike is recognitional if the union representative
says to the employer, "We are striking for recognition and will continue
to picket until you recognize our union." The difficult factual prob-
lems arise when the union does not demand recognition or disclaims
any interest and yet continues to picket the employer.
In the Curtis case, the union had lost a certification election by a
vote of twenty-eight to one and had disclaimed any interest in de-
manding recognition; yet, it still continued to picket the employer's
place of busines. The union's sign before the election read: "Curtis
Brothers on Strike. Unfair to Organized Labor. Driver, Helpers and
Warehousemen of Local 639 (AF of L)." After the election the signs
read: "Curtis Brothers Employs Non-union Drivers, Helpers, Ware-
housemen... Unfair to Teamsters Union No. 639 (AF of L)."" The
Board held, notwithstanding the union disclaimer of intent to demand
recognition, the signs indicated a dissatisfaction with the company's
position which related back to the original dispute. The Board also
indicated that even if this was only an appeal to the customers not to
patronize the Curtis Brothers Company, it was, nonetheless, economic
pressure exerted by the union on the employer and thus indirectly
"coerced" his employees.
The factual pattern in which a union (1) demands recognition, and
(2) then retracts its demand either before or after a certification
election, has occurred often enough to make it profitable to consider
the cases in that pattern. To begin with, in the J. C. Penney Co." case,
the NLRB stated there is a strong but not unrebuttable presumption
that picketing which continues after the union loses a certification
election is recognitional. It is dear that merely changing the wording
on the signs carried by the pickets will not rebut this presumption."
Furthermore, it was held not to make any difference that the signs
declared: "Local 5367 ... wants all employees to join them to gain
wages, hours, and working conditions,"2 or, as the Curtis case would
suggest, that the appeal of the union on its signs was primarily directed
at the employer's customers."0
The Board has also used as evidence the statements made by the
26 119 N.L.R.B. at 237.
27 120 N.L.R.B. 189, 42 L.R.R.M. 1198 (1958). The union lost the election six to
zero. The language on the sign was changed from "We do not patronize J. C. Penney
Co." to "The retail clerks in this store are not members of... Retail Clerks Union."2 8 
-aron Inc. & En Tour, 42 L.R.R.M. 1034 (1958).
29 Casper Mfg. Co., 43 L.R.R.M. 1413 (1959).
80 Layne Bryant Inc., 42 L.R.R.M. 1415 (1958).
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union representatives to the employer. 1 Thus, the NLRB found the
picketing to be recognitional when, in response to the employer's
request that there be an election rather than a continuance of the
picketing, the union president said, "Well get you first. Then the
men will automatically be in." 2
In the Andrew Brown case,88 the NLRB set out the sort of evidence
that would rebut the inference that picketing which continues after
the union loses an election is recognitional. That case required that
there be evidence of organization activities such as sending circulars
to employees, personal solicitations, picketing, urging workers to join,
and other measures calculated to persuade employees to join the union,
in order to rebut the presumption. The NLRB found a complete ab-
sence of those factors in the Andrew Brown case.
It is not dear what type of union organization activities will satisfy
the test recited in the Andrew Brown case. For example, in Louisville
Cap Co.,8" the NLRB found the picketing to be recognitional in spite
of the union's protestations that: (1) it had printed handbills and
handed them out to the employees, (2) the picket's signs appealed to
the workers to join the union, and (3) the union contacted the em-
ployees at their homes and requested them to join the union. In the
Louisville Cap Co. case, the union at first requested recognition and
then later disclaimed interest in obtaining recognition.
The Board found non-recognitional picketing in the Radio Broad-
cast Technicians' Union case." The union in that case represented
six radio and two television stations in one city. The union had a dis-
pute with the owners of the various stations with regard to whether
its members or the members of an announcers' union would be per-
mitted to operate a new "combo-control." At no time after the election
did the union demand recognition (prior to the election the union had
been recognized as the exclusive bargaining agent). The union did not
picket the employer until after it had started a campaign asking the
employer's advertisers not to do business with the employer. The
union clearly indicated to those who approached the picket line that
the union was not striking, but was merely informing the public of
the situation. In view of the fact that the other station owners had
requested a change in their contracts concerning the new "combo-
31 H. A. Rider & Sons, 42 L.R.R.M. 1238 (1958).
32 Midland Elec. States, 43 L.R.R.M. 1238 (1958).
8843 L.R.R.M. 1195 (1959).
8443 L.R.R.M. 1416 (1959).
85 43 L.R.R.M. 1464 (1959).
19591
WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
control," and of the aforementioned union activities, the Board felt
that the union was only acting to protect its interests in maintaining
its bargaining position with respect to the other stations. Therefore,
the Board held that this was not a strike for recognition.
The foregoing cases would seem to indicate the NLRB will find
non-recognitional picketing only if the union both refrains from de-
manding recognition at any time and employs the picketing technique
as an adjunct to other organizational activities. However, this view
must be taken with some hesitation, for it is too early to reach a
definitive conclusion on this problem.
The alleged union unfair labor practice under the Curtis doctrine,
typically, is presented to the NLRB after the union has lost a certifica-
tion election, since the employer may initiate a certification election
under section 9(c) (1) (B)." The employer will be inclined to demand
a certification election, not only because it will constitute good evi-
dence in the subsequent unfair labor practice proceedings, but also
if the union does in fact have a majority, the employer will be guilty
of violating section 8(a) (5)" by refusing to bargain with the author-
ized agent of the employees. Of course, the fact that the union suffers
a decisive loss in the election will constitute persuasive evidence that
the union represents only a minority of the employees.
Replaced strikers. There is yet another problem with regard to
whether a union represents a majority of the employees. In two cases""
the NLRB has held that where some of the union members were not
qualified to vote at the certification election, the union was a minority
union within the meaning of the Curtis doctrine. In both of those
cases the union members could not vote because they had been perma-
nently replaced by other employees. NLRB member Fanning, in his
dissent to the Machinery Overhaul Co. case,' contended that while
the replaced strikers could not vote at the election, they were still
employees under the act. Thus, the argument goes, for this purpose
they should be considered as making up a majority of the workers.
It should be noted in both cases that the union received a majority
3649 STAT. 453 (1935); 61 STAT. 143 (1947); 65 STAT. 601 (1951); 29 U.S.C.
§ 159(c) (1) (B) (1947) provides that a certification election may be initiated by "an
employer, alleging that one or more individuals or labor organizations have presented
to him a claim to be recognized as the representative defined in subsection (a) of this
section."
37 49 STAT. 452 (1935); 61 STAT. 140 (1947); 65 STAT. 601 (1951); 29 U.S.C.§ 158(a) (5) (1947). See n. 20 supra.38 O'Sullivan Rubber Corp., 121 N.L.R.B. 185, 42 L.R.R.M. 1567 (1958); Machinery
Overhaul Co., 42 L.R.R.M. 1527 (1958).
89 42 L.R.R.M. at 1529 (1958).
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of the votes cast at an election, but the replaced employees had no
right to vote. Thus, the union can be placed in the anomalous position
of receiving a majority vote and later finding that it had committed
an unfair labor practice by picketing to enforce its demands.
Other modes of economic pressure. Up to this point, the Curtis
doctrine has been referred to as if it applied only to picketing. In
Alloy Mfg. Co.," a companion case to Curtis Bros., Inc. the NLRB
stated: "As the restraint and coercion brought to play on the em-
ployees is an economic one through curtailment or extinction of their
employer's business; it is not really material whether the pressure is
applied through the acting of picketing, and thereby hurting the busi-
ness, or by other equally effective method."' Using this rationale,
the NLRB held the union's action in placing the employer's place of
business on the Spokane Labor Council's "We do not patronize" list
was a violation of 8 (b) (1) (A). Later NLRB decisions have re-
affirmed this theory.42 While there has been very little elaboration
of this theory by the NLRB, it would appear that the rule of the
Alloy Mfg. Co. case can be logically extended into any sort of activity
which tends to put economic pressure on the employer.
The NLRB has also reached the conclusion that refusing to handle
products in pursuance of a jurisdictional dispute is a violation of
8(b) (1) (A). In the York Corp. case," the employees of Limback
Corporation refused to handle the products of York Corporation be-
cause of a dispute whether Limback's employees would have the right
to fabricate some window boxes. The jurisdiction dispute differs some-
what from the other applications of the Curtis doctrine because in
such a dispute the union's purpose is not to represent some employees,
but rather to deprive them of employment.
It can be seen from the foregoing discussion that the NLRB has
reached the conclusion that section 8 (b) (1) (A) is designed to control
two different sorts of union behavior; namely, (1) the union's use of
economic pressure on the employer to coerce employees, in violation
of their rights under section 7, and (2) the more direct method of
coercing the employees by the use of physical violence and threats of
economic or physical retribution.
40 119 N.L.R.B. 38 (1957).
41 Id. at 40.
42 Layne Bryant Inc., 42 L.R.R.M. 1415 (1958); Andrew Brown, 43 L.R.R.M.
1195 (1958).
43 42 L.R.R.M. 1420 (1958).
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P1E-Empn0N
It is a truism that any valid statute passed by the Congress of the
United States is superior to any state action in the area controlled by
the statute.4 However, unless Congress expressly delimits the activity
to be so controlled, it is up to the courts to determine the permissible
state action within the area controlled by the statue. It is to this
"pre-emption" problem in relation to the National Labor Relations
Act that this section is devoted.
While the Supreme Court has not yet expressed its views on the
Curtis doctrine and its implications, if any, in the pre-emption area,
there have been a number of important recent decisions regarding
pre-emption which have bearing upon the states' power to deal with
the problems covered by section 8(b)(1)(A). To begin with, the
state courts or legislatures may control union behavior which involves
physical violence or mass picketing 5 Further, in a recent decision
of the Supreme Court,'6 a state court was permitted to enjoin shouting
which reasonably might have led to violence.
With regard to peaceful union activity, including picketing, the
picture is somewhat different. Despite an earlier, contrary decision,"7
the Supreme Court has held that the state may not enjoin a secondary
boycott.48
Further, with regard to the factual pattern of the Curtis case, i.e.,
the peaceful picketing by a union representing a minority of the
workers, the Supreme Court has clearly held that the state cannot
enjoin that union activity by statute or otherwise.' The state is not
empowered to act, whether or not the NLRB exercises its power to
the full extent given to it by the statute.0 While at one time state courts
were permitted to award damages even though they could not enjoin
44 U.S. COwST. art. VI. See Samoff, Picketing and The Power of State Courts-
From Thornhill to Vogt, 9 LAB. L. J. 889 (1958) ; State Power to Regulate Labor
Relations-Major Developments During the Supreme Court's 1957-58 Term, 33
WAsH. L. Ray. 364 (1958).
45 Allen Bradley v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 315 U.S. 740 (1941);
UAW v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 351 U.S. 266, 38 L.R.R.M. 2165
(1956) ; cf. UAW v. Russell, 356 U.S. 634, 42 L.R.R.M. 2142 (1958) (suit was for
damages).
46 Youngdahl v. Rainfair, 355 U.S. 131, 41 L.R.R.M. 2169 (1957).
47 Local 10, United Ass'n of Journeymen Plumbers v. Graham, 345 U.S. 192 (1953).
48 Teamster's Union v. New York, N.H. & H. R.R., 350 U.S. 155, 37 L.R.R.M. 271
(1956) ; Weber v. Anheuser-Busch Co., 348 U.S. 468, 35 L.R.R.M. 2367 (1955).
49 Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Fairlawn Meats, Inc., 353 U.S. 20 (1957) ; Garner
v. Teamsters Union, 346 U.S. 486 (1953) ; San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Gar-
mon, 353 U.S. 26 (1957).5 0 Guss v. Utah Labor Relations Board, 353 U.S. 1, 39 L.R.R.M. 2567 (1957).
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the peaceful activity,"' a recent Supreme Court decision has expressly
denied a state court that right. 2
The power of the NLRB is restricted to those unions whose mem-
bers' employer is engaged in "interstate commerce." 3 If the employer
is engaged in interstate commerce, then a state cannot control the
union's behavior. The Washington court has recognized this fact."
It is of some interest to note that the Washington rule is less restrictive
of peaceful union activity than is the Curtis doctrine. The rule in
Washington is that picketing may be enjoined only if the union has
no members employed at the employer's business.5
PROGNOSIS OF THE CURTIs DOCTRINE
The Curtis doctrine had not been passed on by the United States
Supreme Court at the time this Comment was written. Inasmuch as
there are some serious objections which can be made to the validity
of the doctrine, it will be necessary to make an inquiry into the sound-
ness of its rationale.
Constitutionality. The constitutionality of the governmental power
to control union picketing is a long and tortuous path and no attempt
will be made to trace it out here. Suffice it to say that, beginning with
Thornhill v. Alabama," it became apparent that picketing involved
an element of "free speech" under the federal constitution.T The
power of a state to enjoin picketing underwent some development 8
until becoming the present rule that a state may enjoin union activity.
This statement must be qualified by the language contained in Inter-
national B3d. of Teamsters, AFL v. Vogt": "Of course, the mere fact
that there is 'picketing' does not automatically justify its restraint
51 United Construction Workers v. Laburnum Constr. Corp., 347 U.S. 656, 34
L.R.R.M. 2229 (1954).52 San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 43 L.R.R.M. 2838 (1959).
5348 STAT. 926 (1934) ; 49 STAT. 453 (1935) ; 49 STAT. 1921 (1936) ; 61 STAT. 146(1947) ; 62 STAT. 991 (1948) ; 63 STAT. 107 (1949) ; 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1947). "The
Board is empowered, as hereinafter provided, to prevent any persons from engaging in
any unfair practice (listed in section 158 of this title) affecting commerce." The
definition of the term "interstate commerce" is not within the scope of this Comment.54 Stoddard-Wendle Motor Co. v. Lodge 942, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists, 48 Wnl2d
519, 295 P.2d 305 (1956).55 Audubon Homes Inc. v. Spokane Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 49 Wn2d 145,
298 P.2d 1112 (1956). See, Wollett, Another Look at Picketing in Washington, 26
WAsr. L. REv. 169 (1951).
56310 U.S. 88 (1940).
57 U.S. CoNsT. amend. I, limiting the state's power through the fourteenth amend-
ment.58 See, Carpenters & Joiners Union v. Ritter's Cafe, 315 U.S. 722 (1942) ; Baker
and Pastry Drivers v. Wohl, 315 U.S. 769 (1942) ; Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice
Co., 336 U.S. 490 (1949) (held that a state could enjoin a strike on the basis of
public policy).
59 354 U.S. 284 (1957).
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without an investigation into its conduct and purposes. State courts,
no more than state legislatures can enact blanket prohibitions against
picketing."60
The previously cited cases are authority only for the proposition
that the states have power to control union behavior. There is au-
thority, however, for the proposition that the NLRB has the constitu-
tional power to control peaceful union activity. In both Garner v.
Teamsters"' and San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon 2 the
Supreme Court mentioned that the NLRB was empowered under the
National Labor Relations Act to control all peaceful picketing. Those
two decisions, coupled with the Vogt case, would seem to indicate that
the NLRB may constitutionally control peaceful picketing in interstate
commerce. This conclusion, however, does not mean that these cases
indicate Supreme Court approval of the Curtis case's construction of
the statute. It only means that the Constitution does not prohibit such
control.
Construction of Section 8(b) (1) (A). The other problem with
regard to the Curtis doctrine is whether the federal courts will accept
the construction of 8(b) (1) (A) made by the NLRB in the Curtis case.
Both the Curtis Brothers case and the Alloy Mfg. Co. case have
been reviewed by a federal court of appeals. The District of Columbia
court" refused to enforce the NLRB decision in the Curtis Brothers
case. The Ninth Circuit" did not rule on the Curtis doctrine in the
Alloy Mfg. Co. case, because it found that the union failed to object
properly to the Board's decision. But it did refuse to follow the NLRB
holding that non-picketing activities were a violation of section
8(b) (1) (A).
The District of Columbia decision was primarily based upon the
rationale of the NMU decision. The court believed that the legislative
history of the section indicated that 8(b) (1) (A) was intended only
to prohibit physical violence and threats of physical and economic
retribution. It also picked up the NMU theory that 8(b) (4) (C)
would be redundant unless section 8(b) (1) (A) were taken to exclude
all peaceful picketing from its purview.
The Ninth Circuit ruling concerning non-picketing activity took a
different tack. The court pointed out that cases such as Teamsters v.
60 Id. at 294, 295.
61346 U.S. 486 (1953).
6243 L.R.R.M. 2838 (1959).
60 Drivers Local 639 v. NLRB, 43 L.R.R.M. 2056 (1958).
6- NLRB v. International Ass'n of Machinists, 43 L.R.R.M. 2348 (1958).
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Vogt, supra, decided the "free speech" problem only with reference
to picketing, not as to other modes of expression. Thus, the court held
such expressions were clearly free speech. The argument of the Ninth
Circuit that an injunction against non-picketing activity is unconsti-
tutional seems to have some merit, but the validity of its conclusions
must await a Supreme Court decision.
The decision of the Ninth Circuit seems somewhat surprising in
view of the earlier Capital Service v. NLRB"5 case. In the Capital
Service case the Ninth Circuit indicated that it felt the NLRB should
apply section 8(b)(1)(A) to peaceful picketing. The court in the
Capital Service case stated that it believed the legislative history of
section 8(b)(1)(A) was not ambiguous and that it supported a
broader view of the section.
From the standpoint of statutory construction, the Curtis doctrine
is also possibly vulnerable for the reason that, arguably, "coercion"
is not identical with the union's use of economic pressure.
CONCLUSION
This Comment has demonstrated that there are two sound and con-
flicting analyses of section 8(b) (1) (A), and at least three views of the
effect of its legislative history. Thus, the construction of 8(b) (1) (A)
is likely to be fought on the battleground of public policy. This public
policy argument is apt to turn on the effectiveness and desirability of
restricting unionization to the electoral process. It may also be con-
tended that the economic interest of the union in protecting its already
organized union shops from competition with non-union employers
should override the interest of employees who desire to remain non-
union.66
In any event, the Curtis case effects a vital consideration in the field
of labor law.' Moreover, there is little doubt that if the Curtis case
65 204 F.2d 848 (9th Cir. 1953).6 See, GRaEoRy, LAnOR AND THE LAw, 141-157 (1949); Siicr ER & SUmNER,
UNION POLICIS w INDUSTRAm. MANAGEmNT, 370-391 (1941).
67 One should consider the effect of the new "Labor-Management Reporting Act of
1959" (S.1555), passed by the Senate; Section 708(b) which states that it shall be an
unfair labor practice, "(B) Where within the preceding nine months a valid election
under 9(C) of this act had been conducted unless such labor organization has been
certified as representative of the employees of such employer pursuant to such election
or unless such labor organization has been designated or selected as a representative
for the purposes of collective bargaining by the majority of the employees in a unit
appropriate for such purposes.... (7) to picket or cause to be picketed or threaten to
picket or threaten to cause to be picketed, any employer with the object of forcing or
requiring an employer to recognize or bargain with a labor organization as the repre-
sentative of his employees, or forcing or requiring the employees of an employer to
accept or select such labor organization as their bargaining agent"
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were overruled, the prior rules of law would apply. 8 Hence, the fate
of the Curtis doctrine in the pending Supreme Court decision is to be
awaited with considerable expectation.
JoHN C. HoovR
68NLRB v. Local 140, United Furniture Workers, CIO, 233 F.2d 539 (1959);
Progressive Mine Workers v. NLRB, 187 F.2d 298 (7th Cir. 1959). But see, J. W.
Banta Towing, 41 L.R.R.M. 2610 (7th Cir. 1951). These cases applied the earlier
Board rules.
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